AN OVERVIEW OF THE EARLY
YEARS OF THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES
The history of Europe from 950-1250 is one of political,
territorial, cultural, and economic expansion to a degree hardly conceivably at
the beginning of the tenth century. Though broad ranging, this evolution is most
easily visible in military-territorial terms. While the Europe of 900 was under
siege by Magyars from the Southeast, Arab Muslims from the West and South, and
Vikings from seemingly all directions, by 1100 at the latest it was the European
polities that were on the move, hemming in or taming their neighbors and
opponents. That individual European elites and monarchs could contemplate
military campaigns in the Middle East, and then make good on these
contemplations, is stark evidence of strides in manpower and motive forces. Of
course, this reinvigoration is closely related to political and ideological
evolutions distinguishing the post-1000 era from the 700-900s in such a manner
that the later period appears to us as a much more mature phenomenon.
In terms of political evolution, all the pre-850 states, with the
extremely notable exception of Byzantium, crumpled under the foreign military
onslaughts. Unitary sates--in the form of the Carolingian Empire--were unable to
maintain stability, and a seemingly irreversible process of feudal localization
of political, economic, and judicial power set in. During the first half of the
High Middle Ages, though, the picture begins to change. In Germany, Henry
the Fowler came to power and was able to begin holding back the Magyars. His
descendents, in the form of the Saxon dynasty of Germany, instituted the "Ottonian
System," a system of reliance on and control of the clergy, providing a
monarchical administration that sidestepped the various duchies' leaders and
thereby neatly avoided a full descent into localized feudalism. The nobles
revolted throughout the period, but were never, until 1100, as strong as or as
wealthy as the Church-reliant monarchy. In France, Hugh Capet and his
descendants were forced to take another route since the feudal localization of
power was most advanced there. Counts and dukes allowed the monarchy's
continuation only because its occupants were deemed quite weak. The Capetian
dynasty gradually became stronger by working within and through the
feudal political system. Eventually seen as the highest feudal lord, they used
ties of vassalage and notions of feudal legal propriety to build up their power
and wealth to the point that St Louis IX could rule supreme in a French domain
much larger even than the domains belonging to the Western Carolingians. Spain,
while not renouncing feudalism in its Christian parts, was also a variation.
In that to attract settler-warriors for the Reconquista, Spanish sovereigns in
Castile, Aragon, and other areas were quite liberal in the exemptions from
feudal dues that they gave their subjects. In sections of Italy, the
feudal model broke down further, as urban communes wrested self-control from
surrounding petty nobles, then forced the nobles into the cities. The communes
continued to resist control from above, even when the opponent was the Pope or
Holy Roman Emperor.
Ideologically, too, this period shows an expanding horizon. Building on a
foundation of monastic reform begun in the 900-1000s, the Papacy itself began to
spearhead a reform of the Church as a whole, targeting clerical marriage and
purchasing of prelate positions. Ultimately, the reform logic proceeded to
demand that the Pope be the supremely recognized controller of the whole Church
through a powerful administration in Rome, and that the Church, in the person of
the Pope, have freedom untrammeled by elite laymen in all ecclesiastical
matters. The Church began to demand that there be no secular political
interference in the form of investiture of bishops or nomination of popes. This
policy, of course, brought the Church into continuing conflict with secular
kings [the German monarchy in particular]. For its part, the German monarchy (as
well as other kings) still aspired to that supposedly perfect union of Church
and state exhibited by Charlemagne, who controlled his church. On the one hand,
this desire exacerbated conflicts on the intellectual and political level, but
it would also inspire monarchs to support both Christianization along the
margins and campaigns against internal heretics. While on individual matters the
Church and the states often found themselves at odds, the entire intellectual
structure of the time culminated in making the Crusades a viable notion in the
minds of Church, kings, and feudal lords.
Less obvious, but instrumental to Europe's expansion, was the economic
development from the late 900s. This process is visible primarily in
town-development in central Europe, as well as in the flowering of commercial
city-states in the Italian peninsula. Urban development in northern and Western
Europe provided the financial backing for monarchs as well as feudal lords in
the form of taxes and customs, and also provided new constituencies in support
of further commercial expansion. This development would have great import past
1250, all the way into the seventeenth century. In more immediate terms, this
entire period saw the initially plodding, then gradually faster development of
Italian coastal cities organized by traders. Venice was the most conspicuous
example of such a city-state, ruled as it was by a commercial oligarchy headed
by the Doge. Its foreign policy consisted almost entirely of the effort to open
up more areas for trade. To Venice must be added Amalfi, and later Pisa and
Genoa. Of course, the Crusades aided in the economic expansion as the Church
needed the maritime city states to provide naval forces, transportation, and
much-needed commodities. The model that the Italian merchant states set, of
establishing trade enclaves throughout the Aegean and Mediterranean that were
politically tied to the center, would later be emulated by the Portuguese and
Spanish in North and West Africa, hinting at the future Voyages of Discovery.
Also important in this period is the gradual eclipse of Byzantium. From
900-1261, the Empire rose to heights unknown since the rule of Heraclius in 628
and then fell prey to internal decay and external contraction, falling to
its lowest point when it was occupied by Latin knights in the most profound
perversion of the Crusades idea. In every respect though--in its bureaucracy,
diplomatic skill, theological accomplishments, philosophical speculation,
understanding of Islam, and wealth— the Byzantine Empire remained far ahead of
the West. We must attribute its difficulties during this period to yet another
wave of nomadic migrations onto its soil (the Turks) combined with the
unwillingness of indigenous elites to look out for anything but their own
interests at a time when they no longer had the luxury to do so.
In some ways, all this does not exhibit a protean change from the Europe of the
700s-800s, and neither was there a paradigm shift. The relationships between
king and feudal lord, church and state, and distrust of the Muslims that
animated the High Middle Ages certainly existed in the Medieval era's early
years. The Carolingians of the 650s-800s had risen because of personal
lord-vassal relations, and saw this relationship as totally legitimate.
Similarly, Charles Martel the Hammer, Pepin the Short, Charlemagne, and Louis
the Pious had definite ideas regarding the church-state link. They all felt they
knew best how to protect and mentor Christianity while taking advantage of its
worldly components. In turn, the Popes of that era used secular leaders to shore
up their positions and claimed the right to overlordship with just as little
sustained success. Finally, part of the era's Christian identity involved
anti-Muslim sentiment and the military fight against them. Of course, in the
High Middle Ages as well as in the early Medieval period, hatred of the other in
one's midst--be it heretic or more often Jew--was a rampant disease.
This points to the inexcusable darker side of medieval life: intolerance was
the rule; intolerance was the policy. With a Christian frame of mind seeing
itself as the only correct way, anything else was not simply wrong, but
consigned to necessary extermination (as was the case for heretics or
excessively speculative philosophers) or to subsistence in abject penury,
ignominy, and social disability as was the case for Jews. With the exception of
more tolerant climes such as Muslim and early Christian Spain and Sicily, the
intolerant approach was ubiquitous, tempered only by practical concerns such as
the financial benefits of squeezing the out-group dry. At times, especially
among the almost universally illiterate, uneducated, and superstitious masses,
anti-Jewish sentiment exploded into an orgy of plundering and murder [the
Peasants' Crusade]. In this respect, medieval society from the 400s through the
1500s progressed not at all.
In terms of political evolution, all the pre-850 states, with the
extremely notable exception of Byzantium, crumpled under the foreign military
onslaughts. Unitary sates--in the form of the Carolingian Empire--were unable to
maintain stability, and a seemingly irreversible process of feudal localization
of political, economic, and judicial power set in. During the first half of the
High Middle Ages, though, the picture begins to change. In Germany, Henry
the Fowler came to power and was able to begin holding back the Magyars. His
descendents, in the form of the Saxon dynasty of Germany, instituted the "Ottonian
System," a system of reliance on and control of the clergy, providing a
monarchical administration that sidestepped the various duchies' leaders and
thereby neatly avoided a full descent into localized feudalism. The nobles
revolted throughout the period, but were never, until 1100, as strong as or as
wealthy as the Church-reliant monarchy. In France, Hugh Capet and his
descendants were forced to take another route since the feudal localization of
power was most advanced there. Counts and dukes allowed the monarchy's
continuation only because its occupants were deemed quite weak. The Capetian
dynasty gradually became stronger by working within and through the
feudal political system. Eventually seen as the highest feudal lord, they used
ties of vassalage and notions of feudal legal propriety to build up their power
and wealth to the point that St Louis IX could rule supreme in a French domain
much larger even than the domains belonging to the Western Carolingians. Spain,
while not renouncing feudalism in its Christian parts, was also a variation.
In that to attract settler-warriors for the Reconquista, Spanish sovereigns in
Castile, Aragon, and other areas were quite liberal in the exemptions from
feudal dues that they gave their subjects. In sections of Italy, the
feudal model broke down further, as urban communes wrested self-control from
surrounding petty nobles, then forced the nobles into the cities. The communes
continued to resist control from above, even when the opponent was the Pope or
Holy Roman Emperor.